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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care
consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health
insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum
likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult
individuals. The estimation strategy relies on the institutional features of
the Swiss system, in which each individual chooses among the same menu of
contracts, ranked by the size of their deductible.
The empirical analysis shows strong and robust evidence of selection ef-
fects. Nevertheless, once selection effects are controlled for, an important
incentive effect (“ex-post moral hazard”) remains. A decrease in the co-
payment rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health
care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. The correlation
between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decom-
posed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to
incentive effects.
Keywords: Health insurance, demand for health care, moral hazard,
adverse selection, full maximum likelihood estimation
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1 Introduction
Standard insurance theory predicts that expenditures and coverage should
be positively correlated, for two main reasons. First, individuals who ex-
pect high health care costs may choose a more generous coverage (selection
effect) 2. Second, a more extensive coverage may increase health costs (in-
centive effect), either through an increase in the probability to experience
sickness (ex ante moral hazard) or through an increase in expenditures in a
given health state (ex post moral hazard).
Even if these two explanations revert the causality relationship between
costs and coverage, they are quite difficult to separate empirically, especially
on cross sectional data (see, e.g., Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000)). However,
the selection versus incentive effects puzzle can be solved in different ways.
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (RHIE) in 1974 conducted a ran-
domised experiment to estimate how demand responds to changes in price of
1We thank CSS and Konstantin Beck for providing data and many insights, Ramses
Abul Naga, Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori, Alberto Holly, Pravin Trivedi, Stefan Felder, and
Martin Schellhorn for discussions and suggestions, seminar and conference participants
at Toronto (CHERA: 9th Canadian Conference on Health Economics), Taipei (National
Taiwan University), Paris (Fifth European Congress in Health Economics, and CEPR
Public Policy Symposium), Sao˜ Paulo (LAMES), Lund (Eleventh European Workshop on
Econometrics and Health Economics), and Venice (CES-ifo Summer Institute). Finan-
cial support from the Swiss National Fund for Scientific Research (PNR 45) is gratefully
acknowledged. Remaining errors are ours.
2We limit the term of adverse selection to the situation in which insurance firms compete
in contracts and attempt to selectively attract good risks; this is possible only if there is a
selection effect in the sense defined above, but market regulation in Switzerland prevents
adverse selection as far as basic health insurance is concerned.
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health care (Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Group (1996), Man-
ning et al. (1998)). Some natural experiments were also exploited (Chiappori
et al (1998), Eichner (1998)). Finally many studies estimate simultaneously
the demand for insurance and the demand for health care to identify both
effects (Cameron et al (1988), Dowd (1991), Holly et al (1998), Cardon and
Hendel (2001), Schellhorn, (2001), Werblow and Felder (2003)). To address
this issue, the present paper develops a structural microeconomic model of
joint demand for health insurance and health care, and estimate the model
on Swiss data by the full maximum likelihood method.
Since the RHIE gives, in a very robust way, estimation of incentive ef-
fects, most of the recent studies take these results as a reference and concen-
trate on showing evidence of selection effects (Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000)).
Cutler and Reber (1998) show some descriptive evidence of selection effects
through the “Harvard death spiral”; Cameron et al. (1988) find that socio-
demographic and some health variables explain the choice of insurance but
do not test for the effect of unobservable variables. However, Dowd et al.
(1991), Cardon and Hendel (2001) and Jones et al. (2002) test for selection
effects through unobservable variables and find no significant evidence. If the
intuition and the descriptive statistics seems to plead in favor of selection ef-
fects, robust empirical evidence is difficult to find. This difficulty may stem
from the diversity of health insurance plans on many various dimensions.
Coverage of ambulatory care, hospital care, or drugs costs, may substan-
tially differ from one plan to an other, and this often makes it impossible to
rank contracts in terms of extent of coverage.
In Switzerland, mandatory health insurance plan differs only from one
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variable (deductible) between people. This gives a perfect field of investi-
gation for selection and incentive effects. Moreover, a growing evidence of
selection issue emerges from Swiss data (Schellhorn (2001), Werblow and
Felder (2003), Lehmann and Zweifel (2005)). Gardiol, Geoffard and Grand-
champ (2005) also shows that both effects are present in Switzerland.
The main finding of the paper is that even though selection effects are
very important, incentive effects are also present, and far from being neg-
ligible: a decrease in the co-payment rate from 100% to 10% increases the
marginal demand for health care by 88%; a decrease from 100% to 0% in-
creases marginal demand by 150%. In a short way, we estimate that selection
effects explain about three quarters of the observed correlation between in-
surance coverage and health care expenditures, with the remaining quarter
explained by incentive effects.
Section 2 presents the Swiss health insurance system and our data. Sec-
tion 3 develop a structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health
insurance and health care. A parametric version of this model is estimated
in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
2 The Swiss health insurance system
2.1 Overall description
The Swiss health insurance system offers interesting features that can be
used to test for the presence of asymmetric information. Even if it seems
reasonable that, in any system, each individual selects the best contract
given his/her preferences and information, selection occurs only when this
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information is hidden to the insurer, or when it is observed but cannot be
used for risk selection or contract pricing. This latter case corresponds to
the Swiss health insurance system.
In Switzerland, health insurance is a two-tier system. Since 1996, accord-
ing to the federal Law on Health Insurance (LAMal), all individuals must
subscribe to one among several sickness funds. Each fund covers outpatient
expenditures (a bundle of health goods and services defined by law), and half
of inpatient expenditures, the other half being covered by the State.
All insurance contracts include: a deductible on yearly expenditures, a
co-payment rate of 10% once the deductible level has been reached (and a
fixed daily contribution of SFr 10 in case of hospitalisation), and a cap on
yearly payments equal to SFr 600 (approximately 400 euros) in addition to
the deductible. Private non-for profit insurance firms offer a menu of such
contracts, that differ in terms of deductibles and premiums. Since 1998,
deductibles can be equal to SFr 230, 400, 600, 1 200, or 1 500 3. Premi-
ums vary across insurance funds, but are identical for all risk groups, for
a given deductible. In particular, no price discrimination based upon age,
gender, or health condition, is allowed. A risk adjustment scheme between
insurance funds reduces the incentives to select risks. Moreover, the range
of premium reductions for individuals who choose a higher deductible rather
than the basic one of SFr 230 is also limited by law; the explicit motivation of
such a regulation was to implement some redistribution between risk groups,
3Since the 1st January 2004, the cap on yearly payments is equal to SFr 700 and the
lower deductible is equal to SFr 300 rather than SFr 230. At current exchange rates, 1
SFr is approximately equivalent to 0.65 euros, or 0.83 US dollars.
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since it was assumed that high risks individuals would rather opt for small
deductibles.
In short, the law introduced mandatory deductibles and co-payments to
address moral hazard issues, imposed uniform premiums and risk adjustment
to address selection issues, and regulated premium reductions to implement
some form of redistribution explicitly based on self selection. Finally, re-
distribution to some specific groups (low income) take the form of premium
subsidies directly paid by each State (Canton).
In addition to this mandatory health insurance, individuals may also
subscribe to a supplementary insurance, that covers additional goods and
services considered to be “comfort” services, such as a single hospital room,
coverage of alternative medicine, etc. The supplementary insurance contract
may be subscribed at a different insurance firm than the mandatory one,
even though not many individuals use this option.
A particularly interesting feature of the Swiss system is that, as far as
“basic” insurance is concerned, the menu of contracts offered to each indi-
vidual is the same for every individual. This is an important element. Put
simply, theory predicts a selection effect 4: each individual chooses the best
contract, and empirical estimation needs to compare the preferred contract
with other alternatives, which determine the opportunity cost (Cardon and
Hendel (2001)).
A first question we may ask is why different individuals choose different
4Since insurance funds cannot compete in contracts, there is no adverse selection stricto
sensu in Switzerland. However, individuals may self select themselves into the most
adapted contracts, given their private information.
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levels of deductible. The main reason seems to be related to health status:
different expectations about future expenditures may lead high risk indi-
viduals to self-select among plans with more extensive coverage (i.e., lower
deductible). Other reasons may play a role as stickiness, differences in risk
aversion, time preference or cash constraints (the premium being paid in
advance), but the data does not contain the information needed to analyse
these points.
2.2 Data
We use administrative data provided by CSS, one of the largest private (non
for profit) insurance firms in Switzerland. For each adult individual covered,
we observe the amount of yearly health care expenditures as known by CSS,
for individuals living in the Canton de Vaud, the Swiss State that includes the
city of Lausanne. The data set contains information on 62 415 individuals,
and covers four years (1997 to 2000) which represent 199 019 observations.
It is important to stress out that individuals need to address all health
care bills to the insurer if they want to be reimbursed; in some cases (inpa-
tient care, and prescription drugs) the insurer first pays the bill, and then
charges the amount due (deductible, co-payment, daily contribution to hos-
pital housing costs) to the insured. Therefore, the bill may be received by the
insurer, even before the deductible level has been reached and the individual
has an incentive to report an expenditure. This administrative data can rea-
sonably be assumed to be highly reliable (at least above the deductible level)
in the sense that they include most actual health care expenditures (and all
inpatient care expenditures) for the given population. An other benefit of
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such data is the number of observations: exhaustive health care expenditures
for more than 60 000 individuals followed up for four years is certainly highly
valuable information.
Unfortunately, this administrative data provides few variables (with re-
spect to survey data), and this strongly conditions the econometric analysis.
Specifically, the following variables are available in our data set:
• Gender
• Birthyear
• Annual total health costs per insured (outpatient, inpatient and drugs)
for 1997 to 2000
• Deductible for 1997 to 2000
Our sample may not be representative of the Swiss population, or even
of the population of the Canton de Vaud. However, concentrating on a
specific geographic area may reduce unobserved heterogeneity and increase
robustness of results. The descriptive statistics of our work data set are
presented in Table 1.
2.2.1 Data preparation and descriptive statistics
The original data set contains 62 415 individuals. In order to focus only on
our specific problem and to consider yearly observations of each individual
as independent, we exclude all observed sources of exogenous heterogeneity.
We restrict the empirical analysis to a sub-sample composed of the following
individuals:
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• men (in our data, we cannot identify pregnancy costs, fully covered by
insurance funds)
• who stayed at CSS from Jan 1, 1997 until Dec 31, 2000 (this excludes
people who died or switched to another insurance fund)
• who kept the same deductible level during the whole period (only 13%
of our sample changed their deductible at least once during the four
years)
• older than 25 (children and younger adults face a different menu of
contracts)
• who did not receive a premium subsidy. Individuals eligible to the sub-
sidy receive from the State a fixed percentage of the premium (eligibility
condition, and subsidy rate, are based upon income; the subsidy can
cover up to 100 % of the premium), and hence have a stronger incentive
to opt for a low deductible.
• not eligible to disability pension benefits in any of the four years (el-
igibility is based on severe health conditions, and a specific public in-
surance fund covers health care expenses).
The final data set contains 7 885 individuals observed between 1997 and
2000 (which means 31 540 observations). Table 1 presents the population
descriptive statistics of our work data set.
Notice that the proportion of agents with no health expenditures dramat-
ically increases with the deductible level. At the opposite, the proportion of
high health expenditures decreases strongly with the deductible level. This
Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance 10
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of health expenditures across deductible
Deductible 230 400 600 1 200 1 500 all
Number of observations
Age 26-35 929 556 1 081 467 649 3 682
Age 36-45 1 781 870 1 903 869 902 6 325
Age 46-55 2 861 1 202 2 058 803 609 7 533
Age 56-65 2 719 1 069 1 625 490 319 6 222
Age 66-75 2 423 883 963 292 144 4 705
Age 76-85 1 594 439 383 140 45 2 601
Age >85 325 65 35 39 8 472
N= 12 632 5 084 8 048 3 100 2 676 31 540
Annual Health Expenditures
Mean 3 474.6 2 648.3 1 872.5 1 327.5 614.1 2 478.9
Std. Deviation 6 512.9 4 814.9 3 767.7 4 150.4 2 430.5 5 240.3
Mean if participation 4 127.0 3 239.7 2 667.7 2 703.9 1 682.0 3 408.3
[0] 16% 18% 30% 51% 63% 27%
]0; 1 500] 33% 37% 37% 28% 27% 33%
]1 500; 7 500] 40% 37% 28% 17% 8% 32%
]7 500] 11% 8% 5% 4% 2% 8%
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table shows a positive correlation between insurance coverage and health ex-
penditure. As said in the introduction, such a positive correlation may be
due to incentive effects, to selection effects, or to both. The rest of the paper
provides a way to separate these two effects.
2.2.2 Death and the deductible
A first direct evidence of self-selection behavior is given by the analysis of in-
dividuals who died during the four year period (Gardiol et al. (2005)). Table
2 shows that the mortality rate dramatically decreases with the deductible
level 5. Since insurance coverage certainly does not increase the incentive to
die, this provides a strong evidence of selection effects: individuals with a
higher probability to die select lower deductibles, which may reveal that they
rationally expect very large health care expenditures at the end of their life.
Table 2: Mortality rate per class of age and deductible (in per thousand)
Class of age [21-50] [51-64]
Deductible 230 9.8 38.1
Deductible 400 3.6 22.3
Deductible 600 and more 3.1 16.3
We also performed a logit estimation in order to control for gender, and
non linear effects of age (age, age2, and age3 were included in the regressors).
5We group the three highest deductible level since the number of observations is too
low to compute a reliable mortality rate.
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Figure 1: Probability to die per age for men
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Figure 1 shows the average estimated probability to die for men between
21 and 64 years old. The differentiated level of probability to die across
deductible level shows the presence of a selection effect.
Such strong evidence of selection effects induces us to develop a structural
model in order to estimate simultaneously incentive and selection effects.
3 Structural model
This section presents a structural microeconomic model of joint demand for
health insurance and health care, adapted to the Swiss institutional features.
The parametric version of this model is estimated in the next section. To
keep the analysis as tractable as possible, we assume a one period model with
two stages. In the first stage, the agent observes some private information
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and chooses her insurance contract among the offered menu. In the second
stage, an uncertain health state is realised, and the agent consumes health
care and other goods.
3.1 Setup
3.1.1 Information
We assume that ex ante, the agent has some private information θ about
her future health. Ex post, her health state h is drawn from a distribution
conditional on θ, denoted by µ(.|θ). A large value of θ indicates good health,
in the sense that µ(.|θ′) stochastically dominates µ(.|θ) at the first order
when θ′ is larger than θ. An example is h = θ + ε, where ε is drawn from a
distribution independent of θ. Health state h is observed by the agent, but
not by the insurer.
3.1.2 Preferences
Once the health state is known to the agent, she chooses to allocate her wealth
between health care consumption (which monetary cost is determined by the
insurance contract) and other consumption goods. We denote by y ∈ IR+
the total amount of health care used by the individual, and by c ∈ IR+ a
composite consumption good. The marginal rate of substitution between
health care must be affected by health, and a simple way to model this
assumption is to assume that preferences are represented by the following
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
u(c, y, h) = b(h) + α(h) ln(c) + (1− α(h)) ln(y),
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with: α(h) ∈ [0, 1], monotonically increasing with h from 0 to 1, and b(h)
increasing with h. The marginal rate of substitution between health care and
consumption is equal to ((1− α(h))/α(h)) (c/y), and hence for any (c, y) it
decreases with h from +∞ to 0. Bad health (small h, α close to 0) induces
a large MRS for health care.
3.1.3 Budget set
We take the consumption good c as a numeraire, and denote by p the full
monetary unit cost of health care. Hence, if the individual was not insured,
she would pay py. Notice that, given that half of hospital expenditures are
paid by the State, the insured cost py represents the full cost of ambulatory
care and half of inpatient costs.
An insurance contract is characterized by a deductible D, a co-payment
rate τ , and a cap on expenditures that we denote byD+τK. As said above, in
Switzerland contracts differ by their deductible level D, but the co-payment
rate is identical across contracts (τ = 10%), as well as the maximal amount
of annual out-of-pocket health expenditure beyond the deductible (equal to
SFr 600, which corresponds toK = 6000). We denote the insurance premium
by P (D). Insurance contracts only cover monetary costs, and therefore the
total monetary co-payment is given by: min{py,D + τ(py −D), D + τK}.
The consumption of health care also induces non monetary costs, for
example travel and time costs. In practice, such costs may be related to the
opportunity cost of time and to the distance to the point of service. However,
our data does not contain information on those variables. In order to keep
the model as simple as possible, we assume that non monetary unit costs are
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proportional to monetary prices: k = ap. We assume that these costs are
not covered by health insurance and are added to the cost of care. The total
treatment cost for the patient equals the sum of the out of pocket payment
and the non monetary costs.
The available income is denoted by W0. At the time of consumption,
the agent has paid the premium P (D), thus the available income is W =
W0 − P (D). We can now characterise the budget set at the time of health
care consumption. In fact, since the marginal cost of care decreases with the
quantity consumed, the budget set is not convex. However, it is the union
of three budget sets B(W, t), each one corresponding to a co-payment rate
t ∈ {0, τ, 1}: B(W, t) = {(c, y)|c+ p(t+ a)y ≤W (t)}, with:
• W (1) =W
• W (τ) = W −D(1− τ),
• W (0) =W −D − τK.
In the first case, the total cost is c+p(a+1)y, and the marginal monetary
cost of health care is p. In the second range, the total cost is c+pay+τ(py−
D) +D and the marginal monetary cost of y is τp. In the third range, the
agent consumes above the cap; the marginal monetary cost of health care is
zero, and the total cost of (c, y) is c+ pay +D+ τK. In short, the first case
corresponds to a large marginal cost and a small fixed cost, and the latter
case to a small marginal cost and a large fixed cost.
Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps (1977) address the issue of a marginal
price which decreases with the quantity consumed. They build a theoreti-
cal model in which a consumer takes a sequence of decisions; at each time t,
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the consumer computes her marginal cost, which under rational expectations
depends on the expected distribution of annual expenditure, conditional on
the information at time t (in particular, on past expenditures so far). Un-
fortunately, our data does not contain information on the timing of health
care consumption within a given year. Hence we adopt a perfect foresight
assumption: on January 1, the consumer learns h, her health condition for
the whole coming year, and decides the total amount of care she will consume
in that year.
3.1.4 Choice
The timing of the decision problem is the following:
1. Stage 1: The agent privately observes θ. She chooses her deductible
level D among the given menu:
max
D
E[v(W0 − P (D), h˜, D)|θ]. (1)
2. Stage 2: The health state h is revealed, and the agent consumes (c, y):
v(W0 − P (D), h,D) = max
(c,y)∈B(W0−P (D),t)
u(c, y, h). (2)
In this setup, the existence of a selection effect is due to the fact that a
larger value of θ (a better expected health) will lead to the choice of a larger
deductible D (a lower coverage), as Proposition 2 below will show. Thus
observing a larger value of D (a lower coverage) reveals a larger value of θ
(a better expected health); since the distribution of (h|θ) increases with θ,
Bayes’ law implies that (h|D) increases with D.
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3.2 Stage 2: incentive effect
We solve this model by backward induction, and start with the choice of
health care expenditure, given a contract D.
The following proposition characterises the solution to problem (2).
Proposition 1 Assume W > D(1+a)+K(τ+a). There exist two functions
h1(D) and h2(D), both decreasing with D, with h2 ≥ h1, and two scalars λ0
and λτ with λ0 > λτ > 1, such that the solution to problem (2) is given by:
• If h > h2(D), then health care consumption is below the deductible:
t∗ = 1, and y(W,h,D) = Y (W,h);
• If h ∈ [h1(D); h2(D)], then health care consumption is between the de-
ductible and the cap: t∗ = τ , and y(W,h,D) = λτY (W,h);
• If h < h1(D), then health care consumption exceeds the cap: t∗ = 0,
and y(W,h,D) = λ0Y (W,h),
where Y (W,h) is given by: Y (W,h) = (1−α(h))W
p(1+a)
.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition of this proposition is straightforward. First, given D, the
co-payment rate is determined by the realisation of h. The co-payment rate
at the optimal consumption level depends on health h: good health lowers
health care consumption and therefore increases t.
When h decreases but remains in the same range with respect to h1 and
h2, demand for health care smoothly increases: the marginal cost of health
care is not changed, but the marginal rate of substitution between health
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Figure 2: Demand for health care per co-payment rate
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care and consumption increases. However, at the margin h = h2, when h
decreases from h2 + ε to h2 − ε, the marginal monetary cost of health care
drops from 1 to τ : this price effect is a pure ex post “moral hazard” incentive
effect, which leads to a discontinuous increase in y by a factor λτ > 1 (and a
discontinuous decrease in c). The same holds at the other margin, for h = h1.
This proposition states that (ex post) demand can be written as a “natu-
ral demand” Y (W,h), that would correspond to the demand for health care if
no monetary costs were insured, multiplied by a factor λ, which is a function
of the co-payment rate.
Figure 2 shows the demand for health care as a function of h, for a
given value of D. Under no coverage (i.e. a co-payment rate of 100%),
health care demand would be equal to Y (W,h) ≡ y¯(W,h, 1), the demand
under a monetary price of 1.p, for any value of h. However, for values of
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h smaller than h1(D), total health care consumption is above the cap, so
that the co-payment rate is 0%, and the demand increases from y¯(W,h, 1)
to y¯(W,h, 0) = λ0Y (W,h). Notice that a change in D does not change the
“natural demand” Y (W,h), but it affects the threshold values h1(D) and
h2(D): an increasing deductible induces a shift to the left of these values,
therefore reducing demand for some realizations of h.
The threshold values depend on the deductible, and are directly deter-
mined by the function α(.). Hence, if preferences differ across individuals in
the sense that this function α(.) is different, this will imply that the thresh-
old values h1 and h2 depend on the individual. A larger value of α induces
a lower marginal rate of substitution for health care, and smaller threshold
values.
3.3 Stage 1: selection effect
We can now turn to Stage 1, and characterise the choice of deductible. The
optimal deductible is the solution to the problem:
max
D∈{230,400,600,1200,1500}
E[v(W0 − P (D), h˜, D)|θ]. (3)
Private information θ about the distribution of future health h affects the
trade off between different values of D, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2 Assume W > D + τK. The marginal change of expected
utility due to a marginal increase in D is given by:
∂E[v|θ]
∂D
= C0 + C1P (h ≤ h
1(D)|θ) + C2P (h ≥ h
2(D)|t),
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where Ci depend on (W,D, τ,K), with C1 < 0, C2 > 0, C0+C1 < 0 < C0+C2.
Hence, the optimal value of D, solution to problem (3), increases with θ.
Proof: See Appendix.
First, notice that if the distribution of health is very favorable, such that
for any D, P (h > h2(D)) = 1, then we have that ∂E[v|θ]/∂D = C0+C2 > 0:
it is always optimal to have D as large as possible; similarly, when P (h <
h1(D)) = 1 for any D (very bad expected health), then ∂E[v|θ]/∂D = C0 +
C1 < 0, and the best D is the lowest. Now, for θ
′ > θ, we know that
µ(.|θ′), the distribution of h conditional on θ′, dominates at the first order
µ(.|θ). This implies in particular that P (h < h1|θ
′) < P (h < h1|θ), and
P (h > h2|θ
′) > P (h > h2|θ). Since C1 < 0 and C2 > 0, this implies that for
any D, ∂E[v|θ]/∂D increases with θ. In short, when θ is larger, the marginal
net benefit of increasing D is also larger. This implies that the larger θ, the
larger the optimal value deductible D∗.
All other things equal, a smaller θ increases the probability to be below
the cap (h < h1) or above the deductible (h < h2). Therefore it increases
the expected marginal effect of the deductible on out-of-pocket expenditures.
When the agent faces the trade off between a premium reduction (P ′(D) < 0)
and increased out-of-pocket expenditures, a higher θ indicates that contracts
with larger deductible levels will be preferable.
Notice that the same holds under some heterogeneity in preferences, as
represented by differing functions α(.). What matters is that people who
expect a small marginal rate of substitution for health care, whether this is
due to good health or a low α, will opt for a larger deductible level.
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3.4 Specification
Proposition 2 implies that the set of all possible values of θ can be split
into intervals [θi, θi+1] (some of these intervals may be actually empty) such
that Di ∈ {230, 400, 600, 1200, 1500} is preferred if and only if θ ∈ [θi, θi+1].
Therefore, observing a deductible level Di makes it possible to infer that
θ ∈ [θi, θi+1].
Notice however that some individuals did not behave according to equa-
tion (1). In the years considered (1997 to 2000), premiums displayed a very
odd pattern: some contracts were dominated, in the sense that they led to a
total payment on health care (insurance premium and out-of-pocket health
expenditure P (D) + C(y;D)) higher than another contract under any reali-
sation of y. Figure 3 shows the total payment on health care for the whole
range of health care expenditures, for the five contracts under consideration,
in year 1999 (the other years show similar patterns). We can easily see that
it was never optimal to buy a contract with a deductible of 230 Sfr, since
the deductible of 600 or 1 500 Sfr led to a lower total expenditure in any sit-
uation. However, for individuals who expect a high demand, the difference
is very small (Sfr 100 or Sfr 7 per year, respectively), and the computation
may be difficult to perform. Hence, we replace the insurance coverage choice
equation (1) with a logit choice model (Luce and Raiffa (1957), McFadden
(1974)):
Denote by Xi(θ) = E[v(W0−P (Di), h˜, Di)|θ]. We assume that the prob-
ability that the agent chooses the deductible Di is given by:
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P (D∗ = Di|θ) = pii(θ) ≡
ωiX
−ρ
i (θ)∑
j ωjX
−ρ
j (θ)
,
where ρ may be interpreted as the“degree” of rationality; with ρ = 0,
choice is done at random, without any consideration to relative costs and
benefits of alternative choices; with ρ = +∞, choice is perfectly rational in
the sense that pii = 1 for the largest Xi, and 0 for all other values.
The weights ωi represent psychological biases that may favor some values
of D. In particular, ω230 may be considered as larger than the other weights,
since the deductible 230 is labeled as “basic” while the others are labeled
as “option”. Moreover, the deductible 230 corresponds to the historical one,
and inertia may lead people to keep their deductible at this level.
With this limited rationality setting the main conclusion from the struc-
tural model remains unchanged: Individuals in good health (a higher θ), have
a larger probability to choose a larger D so that observing a larger value of
D (a lower coverage) reveals a higher expected value of θ (a better health)
Rather than specifying the assumption on the distribution on θ, and
the distribution of Y (W,h) conditional on θ, we specify the distribution of
demand in the following way. Firstly, since we do not observe income W in
the data, we model the demand Y (h) ≡ E(Y (W˜ , h)], where the expectation
is taken over W . Secondly, we assume that each individual behave as if she
has a natural expenditures level, Y (h), distributed according to a log-normal
distribution, with parameters (µθ, σθ). The deductible choice is related to
the level of θ, so that (D|θ)  (D|θ′) ⇔ θ > θ′. Using Bayes’ law, this
relation may be inverted, so that (θ|D)  (θ|D′) ⇔ D > D′.
Therefore we model this by stating that the natural expenditures level, Y ,
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Figure 3: Out of pocket and premium per deductible (SFr)
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conditional on the deductible level, is distributed according to a log-normal
distribution with parameters (µD, σD). Formally, this distribution is the
convolution of (Y (h)|θ) with the distribution of θ, taken over all individuals
who choose Di.
Under these specifications, we can now easily reformulate selection and
incentive effects:
• if µD and σD differ across deductible levels, there is a selection effect;
• if λt > 1 for t ∈ {τ, 0}, there is an incentive effect.
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4 Testing for Selection and Incentive effects
The structural model implies gaps near the two trim points h1 and h2. How-
ever actual data do not follow this pattern. This may be explained by two
facts. First the insured are not perfectly informed ex ante about the amounts
involved to cure their disease, and reimbursement claims may be transmitted
to the insurer after a variable delay. Second, there is more than one realisa-
tion h in a given year, and there may be several episodes of care in a given
year. In that case, it is not clear which marginal cost of care may determine
demand of care during each episode: under perfect foresight, the marginal
co-payment rate given the whole annual expenditure should be applied to
each episode; under strict myopia, it should be the marginal co-payment rate
determined by previous claims in the same year. This would smooth the
annual demand function.
Accordingly, we assume that the estimated demand stems from myopic
agents, i.e. that agents face a monetary price determined by their current
level of spending. Under this assumption, we have that λ = 1 before they
reach their deductible level, then λτ up to the cap, and λ0 after the cap level
is reached.
The observed consumption level Z is equal to λY , where Y may be inter-
preted as the consumption level that would prevail in the case of a co-payment
of 100%. Since Y = Z/λ, the three different zones for positive expenditures
may be represented as:
Z ≤ D ⇒ Y = Z
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D ≤ Z ≤ D +K ⇒ Y = D +
(Z −D)
λτ
Z ≥ D +K ⇒ Y = D +
K
λτ
+
(Z −D −K)
λ0
Notice that the three zones are delimited only by the observable variable
Z. Therefore, knowing Z, λτ , λ0 we may compute the level of “natural” health
care demand Y .
4.1 Estimation method
The model is estimated through the maximization of the log-likelihood func-
tion. We estimate simultaneously λτ , λ0, µD and σD in a two-step model,
setting pD as the probability of positive health expenditures. In a first step,
we estimate the probability of participation, pD, through a maximum like-
lihood procedure. In a second step, we consider only positive expenditures
and estimate the following three parts log-likelihood function:
L(λτ , λ0, β, γ) = ln
[ ∏
Zi<Di
[
Di − Zi
Di
]
φ
(
ln(Di)− µi
σi
)
+
[
Zi
Di
]
1
Zi
ϕ
(
ln(Zi)− µi
σi
)]
+ ln
[ ∏
Di≤Zi<Di+K
1
λτDi + (Zi −Di)
ϕ
(
ln(Di +
(Zi−Di)
λτ
)− µi
σi
)]
+ ln
[ ∏
Zi≥Di+K
1
λ0Di + (
λ0
λτ
)K + (Zi −K −Di)
ϕ
(
ln(Di +
K
λτ
+
(Zi−K−Di)
λ0
) − µi
σi
)]
where
K = 6 000
µi = X
′
iβ
σi = X
′
iγ
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When the observed health expenditures are under the deductible level,
the possibility of under-reporting exists since agents have less incentives to
claim reimbursement; under-reporting may even take the extreme form of
no reporting at all. However, as said above, this problem only concerns
outpatient care without any prescribed drugs, and hence may be of limited
importance. Nevertheless, observing no claim in a given year, which oc-
curs with a probability (1 − p), may reveal that the agent is in very good
health, or has no incentive to report claims because she is below the de-
ductible. Since we have no way to distinguish these effects in p, we make
two modeling assumptions. First, we allow pD to vary with the deductible
level for every model estimated. Second, the likelihood function weights
observations below the deductible in the following manner: if Zi < Di is
observed, a weight [(Di − Zi)/Di] is given to the assumption that the actual
expenditure merely lies between zero and the deductible level, which occurs
with probability [(Di − Zi)/Di]φ
(
ln(Di)−µi
σi
)
, and a weight [Zi/Di] is given to
the assumption that Zi is indeed the actual expenditure, which occurs with
probability 1/Ziϕ
(
ln(Zi)−µi
σi
)
. The relative weight attributed to the second
assumption increases with the observed value Z.
4.2 Results
The model is estimated in two steps.
4.2.1 Estimation of the first step
The results of the first step are given in table 3, in which p gives the proba-
bility of having positive health expenditures during the year.
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Table 3: Estimation of the first step
pD Coefficient
constant 0.5694
(0.0078)
D400 0.0094
(0.0053)
D600 −0.0889
(0.0063)
D1200 −0.2996
(0.0097)
D1500 −0.4037
(0.0101)
age 0.0044
(0.0001)
log likelihood -16 015
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
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As expected, the probability of having positive health expenditures de-
creases strongly for higher deductible levels. As mentioned above, this effect
can capture selection and under-reporting effects. Not surprisingly the proba-
bility of participation increase with age. All coefficients are highly significant,
except the coefficient of D400 which is positive but not significant at a 95 %
confidence level.
4.2.2 Estimation of the second step
Our identification strategy allows to nest four models by imposing constraints
in the following way, as described in table 4:
Benchmark We assume that there are no selection effects, and no incentive
effects: λτ = λ0 = 1 and for all D, µD = µ, σD = σ.
Incentive only We assume no selection effects (for all D, µD = µ and σD =
σ.). All differences in average consumption are due to incentive effects.
In short, the λ parameters will capture all the correlation between
insurance coverage and expenditures that is not captured by the pD.
Selection only This setting assumes away incentive effects (λτ = λ0 = 1).
Individuals do select the deductible according to their expected level
of demand, but demand is not affected by the deductible level.
Both effects This setting assumes that the correlation between insurance
coverage and expenditures may be due to both selection and incentive
effects. This is the unconstrained estimation.
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Table 4: Constrained and unconstrained second step estimations
Variable Benchmark Incentive Selection Both effects
log-likelihood -179 971 -179 753 -179 835 -179 637
λτ 1.6565 1.8783
(0.0167)
λ0 2.0947 2.4964
(0.0211)
µD constant 5.3923 5.4547 5.5576 5.4635
(0.0304)
D400 -0.0661 0.0195
(0.0185)
D600 -0.1709 0.0356
(0.0194)
D1200 -0.2584 0.1567
(0.0365)
D1500 -0.6914 −0.0522
(0.0653)
age 0.0344 0.0281 0.0330 0.0265
(0.0006)
σ2D constant 1.5261 1.2329 1.5960 1.2674
(0.0276)
D400 -0.1006 −0.1323
(0.0136)
D600 -0.1146 −0.1894
(0.0131)
D1200 -0.0338 −0.1774
(0.0262)
D1500 0.1106 −0.0930
(0.0489)
age -0.0056 -0.0035 -0.0060 −0.0036
(0.0004)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 4: Likelihood ratio tests (critical value)
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Both “selection only” and “incentive only” models are significantly better
than the benchmark (L− ratios of 272.4 and 435.5 respectively). Moreover,
the “both effects” unconstrained model is significantly better than the “in-
centive only” and the “selection only” model (L − ratios of 395.2 and 232
respectively). Hence, incentive effects are present and significant even after
controlling for self-selection effects. Figure 4 gives the details of the test with
the critical value at a confidence level of 95%. All tests are highly signifi-
cant. We conclude that our sample provides evidence of both selection and
incentive effects.
Given the results of the tests, we concentrate hereafter on the uncon-
strained model “Both effects”. As Table 4 shows, incentive effects imply
that when the deductible level is reached, individuals marginally consume
about 88% more than what they would consume under a full marginal mon-
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etary cost. Once the cap level is reached, the marginal consumption is 2.5
times the amount without insurance. Since the confidence interval at a 5%
level for the coefficient of λτ is [1.7627 ; 1.9937] we conclude that λτ is signifi-
cantly different from one. Similarly, the confidence interval for the coefficient
of λ0 is [2.2396 ; 2.7536], meaning that λ0 is significantly different from one
and from λτ
6.
As expected, the global effect of age is increasing wether health expendi-
tures decrease with the level of deductible (see next section for more details).
4.2.3 Joining the two steps together
In order to show the effect of age and deductible on health expenditures,
table 5 displays the expected health expenditures 7 by deductible and age
with respect to µD, σD, pD, λτ and λ0.
As expected, we see that for a given class of age, health care expenditures
decrease with the level of deductible. Moreover, health care expenditures
increase dramatically with age for any of the deductible level.
6Due to the non linearity of the likelihood function, we performed 100 Monte-Carlo
simulations of our complete model, and obtained mean values for the λs of 1.9213 and
2.5820, with respective standard error of 0.0717 and 0.1493. This convinces us that we do
not face a strong small sample bias and that we may rely on the asymptotic values for our
tests.
7Since the model estimates the log of the expenditure, we need to apply retransfor-
mation methods to obtain the expected value of the expenditure (Duan (1983), Mullahy
(1998) and Manning (1998)). However, since we also assume that the “natural demand”
Y , conditional on observablea, follows a lognormal distribution of parameters (µD, σD),
the expected value of the corresponding residual is directly given by e(σ
2
D
)/2. For our
purpose, the precision of this estimate is sufficient.
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Table 5: Expected health expenditures
At age 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Deductible 230 1 250 1 714 2 342 3 192 4 340 5 891 7 985
Deductible 400 1 009 1 403 1 945 2 688 3 703 5 090 6 984
Deductible 600 762 1 079 1 525 2 146 3 009 4 205 5 858
Deductible 1 200 511 751 1 097 1 597 2 314 3 337 4 788
Deductible 1 500 319 480 716 1 058 1 554 2 269 3 296
Figure 5: Observed (O) and expected (E) health expenditures for three de-
ductibles
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Figure 5 compares, for three deductible levels, the mean observed ex-
penditure level per age group with the estimated expected spending for a
representative individual of this age group. The estimation fits very well the
data, except at older age, which may be explained by the very small number
of observations in these groups.
Now that we have a well specified model including both effects, we are
able to assess the main question: How much of the observed difference in
expenditures between the deductible levels is due to self-selection and how
much to incentives? For each deductible level D, we compute the expected
spending if they were attributed a SFr 1 500 deductible level using the es-
timated values of the λ, holding the distribution parameters (pD, µD, σD)
constant. Table 6 gives the observed health expenditures per deductible and
the part of the difference with deductible 1 500 due to incentive and selec-
tion effects. For example, the 230 group spend in average SFr 3 474. With a
deductible of 1 500, they would have spent SFr 2 777 rather that SFr 614 for
“true” deductible 1 500. That is, 76% of the observed difference of SFr 2 860
may be attributed to self-selection.
The values for the other deductible levels are of the same order of magni-
tude (see table 6), so that we may state that the differences in spending are
roughly due for 1/4 to incentive effects and 3/4 due to self-selection effects.
4.3 Normality test
Our empirical model imposes a Log-normality assumption on the underlying
health care “natural” demand. We computed the individual natural con-
sumption Y with the mean of the λs, which we then normalise with the
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Table 6: Part of the observed difference in expenditures due to selection and
incentive effect
Deductible 230 400 600 1 200 1 500
Observed expenditures 3 474 2 648 1 872 1 327 614
Difference with deductible 1 500 2 860 2 034 1 258 713 0
Decomposition
Incentive effect 697 521 306 62
Selection effect 2 163 1 513 952 651
individual µD and σD: Y
(n)
i = (ln(Yi) − µD)/σD for an individual with de-
ductibleD. The Log-normality assumption only affects positive observations,
and hence the estimated participation probabilities pD are not taken into ac-
count. The model assumptions moreover states that the observations under
the deductible level are underestimated due to under-reporting. It is unfor-
tunately impossible to correct these values and perform a formal normality
test. Therefore we rely on the empirical distribution of the estimated Y val-
ues. Figure 6 indicates that the Log-normality assumption is not violated in
a way that would bias our results.
For the observations above the deductible level (right-hand side 8), both
curves are very close. The density is slightly lower than expected for observed
values in the interval between SFr 100 and the deductible, and higher for
observed values below SFr 100. This may reveal some under-reporting, which
8Given the normalisation procedure, the mode corresponds to a natural expenditure
equal to µD.
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Figure 6: Normality test
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Gaussian
Observations
is taken into account in our estimating procedure.
4.4 Robustness of the approach
Up to now, all the presented estimations were done on a specific data set
(men in the Vaud Canton). We repeated the estimation on the four available
samples (women in Vaud, men and women in Geneva Canton). Table 7
presents the λ and the expected health expenditures per deductible in the
four samples. As expected, women spend more in health care than men and
the level of health expenditures in Geneva is on average higher than in Vaud.
In terms of selection effects, the difference of expected expenditures between
the deductible levels are of the same magnitude for all estimations. And in
terms of incentive effects, we can see that the λτ and the λ0 are very close
from one estimation to the other. This allows us to argue that our approach
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can be more generally applied than for one specific population and that the
estimated λ (λτ ≃ 1.9, λ0 ≃ 2.5) may be extended at least to other regions
in Switzerland.
Table 7: Estimations for Men and Women in Vaud and Geneva (at age 40)
Vaud Geneva
Men Women Men Women
λτ 1.878 1.899 1.961 2.055
λ0 2.496 2.388 2.525 2.163
Deductible 230 1 714 2 539 2 423 3 260
Deductible 400 1 403 2 273 2 019 3 024
Deductible 600 1 079 1 799 1 667 2 272
Deductible 1 200 751 1 270 1 340 1 853
Deductible 1 500 480 970 605 1 249
5 Conclusion
To the nagging problem “adverse selection versus moral hazard”, we propose
a typical Swiss solution: “selection and incentive effects”.
From a general model where individuals have a private information on
their health status and preferences for health care, and self select a health
insurance plan, we derive the implications for the swiss setting. Switzerland
is an ideal playground for this topic: the basic insurance is mandatory, the
benefit package and co-payment rate are identical across sickness funds, so
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that the swiss agents have only two questions to answer: Which level of
deductible do I choose, and how much do I consume. The model then sums
up to two sets of parameters: first, (µD, sigmaD) capture private information
inferred from the selected deductible level (D); second, (λτ , λ0) capture the
incentive effects. All parameters were simultaneously estimated through a
non linear maximum likelihood.
We find a very strong selection effect. Once self-selection is controlled
for, there are still important incentive effects. We estimate that when the co-
payment rate decreases from 100% (no coverage) to 10%, individuals increase
their marginal consumption by about 90%. When the monetary costs are
fully covered, the marginal consumption increases by an additional factor of
about 1/3. In short, when the co-payment rate decreases from 10% to 0%
(full insurance), marginal consumption is roughly multiplied by a factor of
2.5.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Our main problem is that, since the co-payment rate decreases with the
quantity of health care consumed, the budget set is not convex. Hence, we
define the pseudo indirect utility function over each linear part of the budget
set:
v¯(W,h, t) ≡ max
c,y∈B(t)
u(c, y, h), (4)
where (c, y) belongs to the budget set B(t) corresponding to the co-
payment value t: B(t) = {(c, y)|c + p(t + a)y ≤ W (t)}, with W (1) = W ,
W (τ) = W − D(1 − τ), and W (0) = W − D − τK. The indirect utility
function v is the maximum of the three following values:
v(W,h,D) = max{v¯(W,h, 1); v¯(W,h, τ); v¯(W,h, 0)}.
With u given by u(c, y, h) = b(h) + α(h) ln(c) + (1 − α(h)) ln(y), with:
α(h) ∈ [0, 1], monotonically increasing with h from 0 to 1, and b(h) increasing
with h, the solution to problem (4) is given by:
c¯(W,h, t) = W (t)α(h) ; y¯(W,h, t) =
W (t)
p(a+ t)
(1− α(h)).
Setting V (h) = b(h)+α(h) ln(α(h))+(1−α(h)) ln(1−α(h)), the indirect
pseudo-utility v¯ is given by:
v¯(W,h, t) = V (h) + (α(h)− 1) ln(p(t+ a)) + ln(W (t)).
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We have
v(W,h,D) = V (h)− (1− α(h)) ln(p) + max
t
{φ(α(h), t)},
where φ(α, t) ≡ (α − 1) ln(t + a) + ln(W (t)). We have that v¯(W,h, t) ≥
v¯(W,h, t′) if φ(α(h), t) ≥ φ(α(h), t′).
First step: φα(α, t) = ln(t + a), hence φα(α, 1) > φα(α, τ) > φα(α, 0).
Second step: φ(1, t) = ln(W (t)) implies φ(1, 0) < φ(1, τ) < φ(1, 1). Third
step: under the assumption W > D(1+a)+K(a+τ), we have that φ(0, 0) >
φ(0, τ) > φ(0, 1).
Hence there exist one value αˆ such that φ(αˆ, 0) = φ(αˆ, 1); for α ≤ αˆ,
φ(α, 0) ≥ φ(α, 1) (and the converse for α ≥ αˆ). At this value of α, we have
that φ(aˆ, τ) > φ(αˆ, 0) = φ(αˆ, 1) if and only if :
ln
(
1+a
a
)
ln
(
1+a
τ+a
) ≤ ln
(
1− D+τK
W
)
ln
(
1− D(1−τ)
W
) . (5)
The left hand side of this expression is equivalent to 1/(1−τ) when 1/a is
small with respect to 1; the right hand side tends to (D+τK)/(D(1−τ)) when
W is large with respect to D+τK. Thus, the inequality holds when a andW
are large enough. If it does not hold, we simply set α1 = α2 = αˆ. If inequality
(5) holds, there exist two values α1 and α2, with 0 < α1 < αˆ < α2 < 1, such
that maxt{φ(α, t)} is: φ(α, 0) for α ≤ α1; φ(α, τ) for α ∈ [α1, α2]; φ(α, 1) for
α ≥ α2. These two values are defined by:
α1 ≡ 1−
ln
(
W (τ)
W (0)
)
ln
(
τ+a
a
) .
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α2 ≡ 1−
ln
(
W (1)
W (τ)
)
ln
(
1+a
τ+a
) .
It is straightforward to check that W (τ)/W (0) and W (1)/W (τ) increase
with D, and thus that both α1 and α2 decrease with D. Since α(h) is
increasing with h from 0 to 1, we may translate these two values into: hi ≡
α−1(αi), which also decrease with D.
Denote Y (W,h) ≡ y¯(W,h, 1). When h ≥ h2(W,D), we know that
v¯(W,h, 1) is larger than v¯(W,h, τ), which itself is larger than v¯(W,h, 0), and
hence that y(W,h,D) = y¯(W,h, 1) = Y (W,h). When h ∈ [h1(W,D), h2(W,D)],
we have that y(W,h,D) = y¯(W,h, τ) = W (τ)
p(a+τ)
(1−α(h)) = W (τ)(a+1)
W (1)(a+τ)
Y (W,h).
Finally, for h ≤ h1, we have that v¯(W,h, 0) ≥ v¯(W,h, τ) ≥ v¯(W,h, 0), and
thus y(W,h,D) = y¯(W,h, 0) = W (0)
pa
(1− α(h)) = W (0)(a+1)
W (1)a
Y (W,h).
In summary, if we denote by:
λτ ≡
W (τ)(a + 1)
W (1)(a+ τ)
; λ0 ≡
W (0)(a+ 1)
W (1)a
,
we have that:
• If h ≥ h2(W,D), then y(W,h,D) = Y (W,h);
• If h ∈ [h1(W,D); h2(W,D)], then y(W,h,D) = λτY (W,h);
• If h ≤ h1(W,D), then y(W,h,D) = λ0Y (W,h).
For W large enough (formally, for W > D(1 + a) + (a + τ)K), we have
that λ0 > λτ > 1.
Q.E.D
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We now need to compute ∂E[v|θ]/∂D. We have that:
E[v|θ] = E[K(h)− (1− α(h))p|θ]
+
∫ h1(D)
[(α(h)− 1) ln(a) + ln(W0 − P (D)−D − τK)]µ(h|θ)dh
+
∫ h2(D)
h1(D)
[(α(h)− 1) ln(τ + a) + ln(W0 − P (D)−D(1− τ))]µ(h|θ)dh
+
∫
h2(D)
[(α(h)− 1) ln(1 + a) + ln(W0 − P (D))]µ(h|θ)dh.
Since the value of the integrand is continuous at h1(D) and h2(D), we have:
∂E[v|θ]
∂D
= −
P ′(D) + 1
W0 − P (D)−D − τK
P (h ≤ h1(D)|θ)
−
P ′(D) + 1− τ
W0 − P (D)−D(1− τ)
P (h ∈ [h1(D), h2(D)]|θ)
−
P ′(D)
W0 − P (D)
P (h ≥ h2(D)|θ).
Hence, setting pi1 = P (h ≤ h
1(D)|θ) and pi2 = P (h ≥ h
2(D)|θ) (and short-
ening W0 − P (D) into W ), we have:
∂E[v|θ]
∂D
= −
(
P ′(D) + 1
W −D − τK
)
pi1−
(
P ′(D) + 1− τ
W −D(1− τ)
)
(1−pi1−pi2)−
(
P ′(D)
W
)
pi2.
Define C0 = −
(
P ′(D)+1−τ
W−D(1−τ)
)
, C1 = −C0 −
(
P ′(D)+1
W−D−τK
)
, and C2 = −C0 −(
P ′(D)
W )
)
. Since −1 < P ′(D) < 0, we immediately have that C0 + C1 < 0 <
C0 + C2. We also have that C1 =
(
−(P ′(D)+1)(K+D)−(W−D−τK)
(W−D(1−τ))(W−D−τK)
)
, which is
negative as soon as W > D + τK. And, finally, C2 =
(
(1−τ)(W+DP ′(D))
W (W−D(1−τ))
)
,
which is positive since W > D.
Q.E.D
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